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(assuming that the opinion of the Court of Appeals does not
foreclose our drawing such inferences) are insufficient to
overcome petitioners’ evidence, viewed in the light of the degree
of credibility that the Court of Appeals has assigned to it.
For example, on remand, respondent places considerable
reliance on the fact that petitioners reported the tax payments
in question on Schedules E as S corporation expenses relating to
misidentified real properties, rather than on Schedules C as
expenses of a business conducted by petitioners in their
individual capacity. Ultimately, however, whatever adverse
inferences we might draw from such facts appear to be overcome by
what the Court of Appeals believed to be credible testimony by
Mr. Griffin that the tax payments in question were made with
respect to a separate trade or business in which Mr. Griffin was
individually engaged.
Likewise, the remaining evidence in the record, consisting
largely of the stipulated facts and the joint exhibits, does not
directly establish or refute petitioners’ allegation that they
were individually engaged in a separate trade or business apart
from their investments in S corporations and partnerships. Any
inferences that we might draw from this evidence (or lack
thereof) would not overcome Mr. Griffin’s testimony in light of
the degree of credibility assigned to it by the Court of Appeals.
Giving effect to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Mr.
Griffin’s testimony was credible and sufficient to place the
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Last modified: May 25, 2011