- 10 - (assuming that the opinion of the Court of Appeals does not foreclose our drawing such inferences) are insufficient to overcome petitioners’ evidence, viewed in the light of the degree of credibility that the Court of Appeals has assigned to it. For example, on remand, respondent places considerable reliance on the fact that petitioners reported the tax payments in question on Schedules E as S corporation expenses relating to misidentified real properties, rather than on Schedules C as expenses of a business conducted by petitioners in their individual capacity. Ultimately, however, whatever adverse inferences we might draw from such facts appear to be overcome by what the Court of Appeals believed to be credible testimony by Mr. Griffin that the tax payments in question were made with respect to a separate trade or business in which Mr. Griffin was individually engaged. Likewise, the remaining evidence in the record, consisting largely of the stipulated facts and the joint exhibits, does not directly establish or refute petitioners’ allegation that they were individually engaged in a separate trade or business apart from their investments in S corporations and partnerships. Any inferences that we might draw from this evidence (or lack thereof) would not overcome Mr. Griffin’s testimony in light of the degree of credibility assigned to it by the Court of Appeals. Giving effect to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Mr. Griffin’s testimony was credible and sufficient to place thePage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011