- 14 - Respondent suspended his activity with respect to the Swanton programs from April 1984 until the period of limitations for criminal prosecution of Mr. Swanton expired because Mr. Swanton was being criminally investigated by DOJ. We have previously held that the delay of a civil matter until resolution of related criminal proceedings is reasonable. Taylor v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 206, 212 (1999), affd. 9 Fed. Appx. 700 (9th Cir. 2001). After the criminal investigation of Mr. Swanton ended, litigation in this Court for the pre-TEFRA Swanton programs continued until September 1992. See Smith v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1349 (1989); Kelley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-495. The mere passing of time during the litigation phase of a tax dispute does not establish error or delay by the Commissioner in performing a ministerial act, because decisions about how to proceed in the litigation phase of a case necessarily involve discretion. Lee v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. at 150. We therefore conclude, as this Court did in Beagles v. Commissioner, supra, that it was not an abuse of discretion for respondent to deny abatement of interest for the period April 15, 1984, through May 8, 1992. Beagles v. Commissioner, supra, does not provide us with guidance for periods after May 8, 1992, because in that case the Commissioner granted interest abatement to the taxpayer for thePage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Next
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