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public law but was not codified. However, despite not being
incorporated into the Code, RRA 1998 sec. 3501, has the force of
law. See, e.g., Rochelle v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 356, 358 n.2
(2001), affd. 293 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2002); Smith v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 489, 491 (2000), affd. 275 F.3d 912 (10th
Cir. 2001).
Respondent offers inconsistent meanings of the word
“collection” in the context of offsets as between Rev. Proc.
2000-15, sec. 5, and RRA 1998 sec. 3501(a). Respondent argues
that collection actions requiring notice only occur when the
taxpayer retains a right to prevent the actual collection action
from occurring. However, RRA 1998 sec. 3501 makes no such
distinction and requires the Commissioner to send notice
regardless of the type of collection activity that is occurring.
The notice is not intended to preempt collection action; rather,
it is intended to be informative.
Congress enacted the change to collection-related notices in
connection with the same statutory scheme that added the 2-year
period of limitations to claims made under subsections (b) and
(c) of section 6015. S. Rept. 105-174, at 59-60 (1998), 1998-3
C.B. 537, 595-596. The legislative history makes it clear that
Congress imposed the 2-year limitation period as part of a new
statutory mechanism that also requires the Commissioner to alert
taxpayers to their section 6015 rights. Id.; see also H. Conf.
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