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2000-15, sec. 5, should not be applied in a manner which
frustrates the legislative intent of section 6015 and the related
public law.
Accordingly, we hold that the running of the 2-year period
set forth in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 5, was not commenced by the
collection activity in May 1999. Respondent’s contrary
interpretation of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 5, is an abuse of
discretion.4
In Rochelle v. Commissioner, supra, and Smith v.
Commissioner, supra, we upheld the adequacy of notices of
deficiency despite their failure to state accurately the Tax
Court petition due date where there was no prejudice to the
taxpayers as a result of the Commissioner’s failure to follow the
public law. The petition due dates in those cases were
statutory, not provided by a revenue procedure. Regardless, we
specifically stated in Rochelle that “Simply put, this is not a
case of taxpayer prejudice which Congress intended to rectify”.
Rochelle v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 363. Our holding in Smith
relied on the lack of prejudice to the taxpayer, stating: “where
respondent failed to put the petition date on the notice, and
petitioners nevertheless received the notice and filed a petition
4Petitioner also argues that it is inappropriate to have a
strict limitations period on sec. 6015(f) because sec. 6015(f) is
designed to address inequitable situations. Because of our
analysis in this case, it is not necessary for us to reach this
argument.
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