Maureen Monsour - Page 28

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          ing that she is entitled to relief under section 6015(b) and (f).           
          The parties have a disagreement over who bears the burden of                
          showing whether section 6015(g)(2) precludes petitioner from the            
          relief that she claims under section 6015.  According to peti-              
          tioner, respondent bears the burden of proof under section                  
          6015(g)(2).15                                                               
               Except where section 6015 provides otherwise, see sec.                 
          6015(c)(3)(A)(ii), (c)(3)(C), (d)(3)(C), petitioner bears the               
          burden of proof under that section.  See Rule 142(a); see also              
          Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 113 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d            
          1181 (10th Cir. 2003).  Section 6015 does not provide that re-              
          spondent bears the burden of proof under section 6015(g)(2).  We            
          conclude that petitioner bears the burden of proof under that               
          section.                                                                    


               15Petitioner argues, in the alternative, that respondent               
          should be precluded from relying on sec. 6015(g)(2) because                 
          respondent did not raise that provision in respondent’s plead-              
          ings.  We reject petitioner’s alternative argument regarding sec.           
          6015(g)(2).  Although respondent did not raise that section in              
          respondent’s pleadings, respondent argued in the pretrial memo-             
          randum that respondent submitted to the Court that sec.                     
          6015(g)(2) precluded petitioner from relief under sec. 6015, and            
          petitioner argued in the pretrial memorandum that petitioner                
          submitted to the Court that sec. 6015(g)(2) did not preclude                
          petitioner from relief under sec. 6015.  Moreover, at trial, the            
          parties adduced evidence relating to petitioner’s participation             
          in the case for the taxable years at issue.  On the record before           
          us, we find that the parties tried the issue under sec.                     
          6015(g)(2) by consent and that that issue is treated in all                 
          respects as having been raised in respondent’s pleadings.  See              
          Rule 41(b)(1); see also Pierce v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-            
          188.                                                                        





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