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ing that she is entitled to relief under section 6015(b) and (f).
The parties have a disagreement over who bears the burden of
showing whether section 6015(g)(2) precludes petitioner from the
relief that she claims under section 6015. According to peti-
tioner, respondent bears the burden of proof under section
6015(g)(2).15
Except where section 6015 provides otherwise, see sec.
6015(c)(3)(A)(ii), (c)(3)(C), (d)(3)(C), petitioner bears the
burden of proof under that section. See Rule 142(a); see also
Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 113 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d
1181 (10th Cir. 2003). Section 6015 does not provide that re-
spondent bears the burden of proof under section 6015(g)(2). We
conclude that petitioner bears the burden of proof under that
section.
15Petitioner argues, in the alternative, that respondent
should be precluded from relying on sec. 6015(g)(2) because
respondent did not raise that provision in respondent’s plead-
ings. We reject petitioner’s alternative argument regarding sec.
6015(g)(2). Although respondent did not raise that section in
respondent’s pleadings, respondent argued in the pretrial memo-
randum that respondent submitted to the Court that sec.
6015(g)(2) precluded petitioner from relief under sec. 6015, and
petitioner argued in the pretrial memorandum that petitioner
submitted to the Court that sec. 6015(g)(2) did not preclude
petitioner from relief under sec. 6015. Moreover, at trial, the
parties adduced evidence relating to petitioner’s participation
in the case for the taxable years at issue. On the record before
us, we find that the parties tried the issue under sec.
6015(g)(2) by consent and that that issue is treated in all
respects as having been raised in respondent’s pleadings. See
Rule 41(b)(1); see also Pierce v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-
188.
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