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notice17 and therefore did not have a realistic opportunity to
challenge the proposed deficiency in the Tax Court.18 That
interpretation is consistent with respondent’s position that the
term “underlying tax liability”, as used in section
6330(c)(2)(B), does not include self-assessed amounts.
IV. Conclusion
I conclude that section 6330(c)(2)(B), describing the
limited circumstances in which a taxpayer may challenge the
existence or amount of the underlying tax liability at a section
6330 hearing, does not allow the taxpayer to challenge her
obligation to pay any reported but unpaid tax.19 Accordingly,
17 In informal remarks, one Treasury official specifically
identified that situation as the proper focus of any expanded
appeal rights. See Holmes, “Proposed Taxpayer Rights Changes
Questioned by Treasury Attorney Rizek”, 74 Daily Tax Rept. at G-3
(Apr. 17, 1998); see also Donmoyer, “Treasury Still Ignoring IRS
Reform Bill’s Controversial Elements,” 78 Tax Notes 411
(describing Associate Tax Legislative Counsel Rizek as “one of
Treasury’s chief negotiators during the drafting of the IRS
reform bill”).
18 A notice of deficiency mailed to a taxpayer’s “last
known address” is sufficient to commence the usual 90-day period
during which the taxpayer may petition the Tax Court for a
redetermination of the deficiency, regardless of whether the
taxpayer actually receives the notice. See, e.g., Frieling v.
Commissioner, 81 T.C. 42, 52 (1983); Tatum v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2003-115 n.4; see also sec. 6212(b); sec. 301.6212-2,
Proced. & Admin. Regs.
19 I acknowledge that such conclusion is at odds with dicta
appearing in prior reports of the Court, which reflect
concessions made by the Commissioner. See Craig v. Commissioner,
119 T.C. 252, 261 (2002) (Commissioner conceded that taxpayer was
entitled to dispute self-assessed liability at CDP hearing);
(continued...)
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