- 8 -
requests for information would tend to subject them to criminal
prosecution.9 Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444
(1972); Moore v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1984),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1983-20. More fundamentally, however, even if
petitioners had validly asserted a privilege against self-
incrimination in this proceeding, such an assertion would not
substitute for relevant evidence, see United States v. Rylander,
460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983); Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661,
684-685 (1989); Traficant v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 501, 504
(1987), affd. 884 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1989), and consequently
would not relieve petitioners of the section 7491(a)(1)
requirement that they introduce relevant credible evidence as a
precondition of our placing the burden of proof on respondent.
9 Respondent obtained critical evidence against petitioners
pursuant to a summons issued under sec. 7602, which was enforced
in a Federal District Court under sec. 7604. Petitioners do not
question, in this proceeding, whether the District Court properly
ordered them to produce records in the prior summons enforcement
proceeding, and they do not request that we exclude on Fifth
Amendment grounds evidence obtained in that proceeding. See,
e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964) (specifying the
requirements for enforcing an Internal Revenue Service summons).
Petitioners make no allegation that respondent violated sec.
7602(d), which provides rules regarding the issuance of a summons
in the case of a Department of Justice referral for grand jury
investigation or criminal prosecution.
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