Harold and Doreen Silk - Page 8

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          section 172(b)(3) were satisfied.  We are not persuaded that the            
          postal receipt demonstrates that the so-called draft return and             
          the April 4, 1996 letter were mailed to, and received by,                   
          respondent.  First, the postal receipt bears a date earlier than            
          the date of the April 4, 1996 letter.  Second, the postal receipt           
          indicates postage paid of 32 cents.  The postal rate in effect              
          for 1996 was 32 cents for the first ounce and 23 cents for each             
          additional ounce.  Thus, the postal receipt does not reflect the            
          proper amount of postage necessary to mail the 10-page so-called            
          draft return and the April 4, 1996 letter.  Third, petitioner               
          admitted that such letter may have been mailed to respondent with           
          the so-called draft return, with the 1995 extension application,            
          or independently of either document.  Finally, respondent did not           
          receive either the so-called draft return or the April 4, 1996              
          letter.  Therefore, we cannot accept petitioners’ claim that the            
          postal receipt demonstrates that the so-called draft return and             
          the April 4, 1996 letter were ever mailed to, or received by,               
          respondent.5                                                                
               On March 27, 1997, petitioners filed the 1995 return.                  
          However, petitioners did not attach any statement to the 1995               


               5  We note that the postal receipt does support the fact               
          that petitioners mailed to respondent their 1995 extension                  
          application on Apr. 3, 1996.  Even if we were to assume arguendo            
          that the letter was attached to the extension application, this             
          would still be insufficient to satisfy the statutory and                    
          regulatory requirements under sec. 172(b)(3).                               





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