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petitioners and respondent alike in connection with such a
subsequent lawsuit in a Federal District Court, and it would be
an inefficient use of the judiciary’s limited resources to
require that petitioners’ liability for interest be tried in two
courts instead of one.
Where as here the existence and amount of an underlying tax
liability is properly at issue in an appeal brought under section
6330(d)(1), we review the taxpayer’s liability de novo. Sego v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000). Petitioners do not in
their papers include any calculation of disputed interest but
simply set forth two reasons in support of their claim that their
interest liability is now zero. Petitioners argue first that the
Form 4549-CG conclusively determined their 1993 liability for
Federal income tax, inclusive of penalty and interest, and that
respondent is now barred from making any additional assessment
for that year. Petitioners argue second that the assessment for
the disputed interest is invalid in that they were not informed
about that interest before the assessment was made.
We disagree with both of petitioners’ arguments. As to the
first argument, it is firmly established that section 7121 sets
forth the exclusive means by which an agreement between the
Commissioner and a taxpayer concerning the latter’s tax liability
may be accorded finality. E.g., Hudock v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
351, 362 (1975). Section 7121 authorizes the Commissioner to
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