- 20 -                                         
          (3) closed the trial record, (4) invited, but did not require,              
          the parties to file posttrial briefs, and (5) set a schedule for            
          the filing of briefs.  Only respondent filed a posttrial brief.             
          In his posttrial brief, respondent continued to argue that some             
          of petitioner’s alleged business expenses should be disallowed              
          but, with regard to certain expenses, asserted grounds for the              
          disallowance that were different from the ground asserted in the            
          notices of deficiency.                                                      
                                       OPINION                                        
          I.  Schedule C Income and Deductions                                        
               A.  Burden of Proof                                                    
               Normally, in a case before this Court, the taxpayer bears              
          the burden of proof.  Rule 142(a).11  That burden has often been            
          interpreted to mean that the taxpayer bears the ultimate burden             
          of persuasion; i.e., the risk of nonpersuasion, as well as the              
          initial burden of production.  See, e.g., Gerling Intl. Ins. Co.            
          v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 468, 476 n.5 (1986).                               
               In this case, petitioner bears the burden of proof.  Rule              
          142(a).  Because petitioner bears the burden of proof, petitioner           
          has the initial burden of production, which requires her to                 
               11Under certain circumstances, sec. 7491(a)(1), which was              
          enacted in 1998, shifts the burden of proof to respondent.  Sec.            
          7491 applies to court proceedings arising in connection with                
          examinations beginning after July 22, 1998.  Because the                    
          examination of petitioner’s returns commenced before July 23,               
          1998, sec. 7491(a)(1) is inapplicable to this case.                         
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