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disabled and fully capable of working an 8-hour day. Petitioner
returned to work full-time in March 2002.
Based on the record before us, we find that petitioner’s
condition was not of a long-continued and indefinite duration as
required by section 72(m)(7). Petitioner’s condition did not
prevent her from returning, and, in fact, petitioner did return,
to comparable substantial gainful activity at USPS. Therefore,
we find that petitioner was not disabled within the meaning of
section 72(m)(7) at the time of the distribution.3
Petitioner’s suggestion with respect to the consequences of
the bankruptcy plan is somewhat undermined by the fact that she
stopped making repayments prior to the date that the bankruptcy
proceeding was commenced. Furthermore, there is no specific
exception under section 72(t)(2) that addresses her situation.
With respect to section 72(t), this Court has repeatedly ruled
that it is bound by the list of statutory exceptions under
section 72(t)(2), none of which is applicable here. Arnold v.
Commissioner, 111 T.C. 250, 255 (1998); Schoof v. Commissioner,
110 T.C. 1, 11 (1998); Swihart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-
407. Although the Court is somewhat sympathetic to petitioner’s
situation, we are constrained to sustain respondent’s
3 Because petitioner was working full-time as a mail
carrier, she was likewise not disabled within the meaning of sec.
72(m)(7) at the time that she obtained the loan from the
retirement plan.
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