-30- trainer a one-half interest in the animal once he had recovered acquisition costs and expenses. Id. at 721. The taxpayer did not make the promise in lieu of payment of the standard trainer’s fee, however, and continued to compensate the trainer for the services he provided in relation to the horse until the time of the transfer. After the transfer, the taxpayer and the trainer made joint decisions regarding the horse, created a partnership agreement, agreed to share profits equally, computed what the partnership’s tax return would show (although they did not file a partnership return for the year in issue), and reported the results of the computation on their individual returns. Id. at 722, 723. Because of the presence of all of these factors, we found that the taxpayer and the trainer had formed a joint venture. Id. at 725. McDougal, therefore, is distinguishable from this case because there is no evidence petitioner and his attorney agreed to form a partnership, shared control over petitioner’s legal claims, considered their relationship a separate entity for tax purposes or treated it as such, or considered the attorney’s fees to be anything other than compensation for services. Consequently, we reject petitioner’s contention. C. Conclusion Because the Supreme Court’s opinion in Commissioner v. Banks, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005), is controlling, wePage: Previous 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Next
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