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trainer a one-half interest in the animal once he had recovered
acquisition costs and expenses. Id. at 721. The taxpayer did
not make the promise in lieu of payment of the standard trainer’s
fee, however, and continued to compensate the trainer for the
services he provided in relation to the horse until the time of
the transfer. After the transfer, the taxpayer and the trainer
made joint decisions regarding the horse, created a partnership
agreement, agreed to share profits equally, computed what the
partnership’s tax return would show (although they did not file a
partnership return for the year in issue), and reported the
results of the computation on their individual returns. Id. at
722, 723. Because of the presence of all of these factors, we
found that the taxpayer and the trainer had formed a joint
venture. Id. at 725. McDougal, therefore, is distinguishable
from this case because there is no evidence petitioner and his
attorney agreed to form a partnership, shared control over
petitioner’s legal claims, considered their relationship a
separate entity for tax purposes or treated it as such, or
considered the attorney’s fees to be anything other than
compensation for services. Consequently, we reject petitioner’s
contention.
C. Conclusion
Because the Supreme Court’s opinion in Commissioner v.
Banks, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005), is controlling, we
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