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jurisdiction on that ground. The facts in the present case are
distinguishable from those in Smith v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. __.
Specifically, the notice of determination upon which this case is
based was issued to petitioner well after the automatic stay was
terminated. Because the petition was timely filed in response to
a notice of determination that is valid on its face, we conclude
that petitioner properly invoked our jurisdiction under section
6330. See Sarrell v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 122, 125 (2001);
Moorhous v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 263, 269 (2001); Offiler v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 492, 498 (2000); see also Rule 330(b).
Respondent maintains that petitioner should be estopped from
asserting that the final notice of intent to levy violated the
automatic stay because she failed to inform respondent during the
administrative proceedings that she had filed a bankruptcy
petition. Respondent cites Matthews v. Rosene, 739 F.2d 249 (7th
Cir. 1984), for the proposition that a debtor may be barred by
the equitable doctrine of laches from challenging an action that
arguably violated the automatic stay.
We are not persuaded by respondent’s argument. The record
suggests that petitioner was acting pro se throughout the
administrative proceedings. Without more, we presume that
petitioner acted in good faith and that she was unaware that
respondent’s issuance of the final notice of intent to levy
violated the automatic stay. Respondent, on the other hand, had
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