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liquidate the loan.’” Williams v. Commissioner, supra at 1035
(quoting Dolese v. United States, 605 F.2d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir.
1979)). None of these factors, standing alone, is determinative
of the issue before us. Alterman Foods, Inc. v. United States,
supra at 876-877 n.6. However, these factors are useful in
determining whether there is a true intention to repay.
As previously stated, Mr. Bruecher is the sole shareholder
of Bruecher Foundation. He actively directs and operates
Bruecher Foundation and makes the decisions as to the timing,
amounts, and uses of the funds advanced by Bruecher Foundation.
Prior to 1998, Bruecher Foundation had paid Mr. Bruecher
neither a salary nor a dividend. Mr. Bruecher first received a
salary early in 1998 when his accountant reclassified about
$114,000 of “advances” as wages. It is clear that Mr. Bruecher
used Bruecher Foundation’s bank account to pay his own personal
expenses and in certain instances expenses related to his
Schedule C “landscaping/foundation” business. In fact, for tax
years 1998 and 1999, Mr. Bruecher maintained a business banking
account for his Schedule C business, which was separate from
Bruecher Foundation’s banking account. He did not maintain his
own separate personal bank account.
There were no written agreements such as promissory notes
between Mr. Bruecher and Bruecher Foundation concerning the
“advances” to Mr. Bruecher. Mr. Bruecher did not give any
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