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excess of the statutory limit. See sec. 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii).
Petitioner does not argue, and has otherwise failed to
demonstrate, that there was a limited availability of qualified
attorneys or attorneys with tax expertise to represent her in
this case or that the issues presented were sufficiently
difficult to support her claim for an enhanced hourly rate. That
petitioner’s attorneys billed her and the other Hoyt investor
clients for professional services at a lower rate than the local
customary rate does not establish that the fees petitioner claims
are reasonable.19 We conclude, therefore, that petitioner may
not recover attorney’s fees in excess of $150 per hour. See id.
With respect to the attorney’s fees and costs charged to
petitioner’s individual account, we award petitioner $615 for
work performed by Ms. Pearson20 and $960 for work performed by
Ms. Merriam.21 Because Ms. Gellner’s and Mr. Coles’s hourly
rates do not exceed the statutory limit, we find those fees are
reasonable and award petitioner $1,875 and $812.50 for Ms.
Gellner’s and Mr. Coles’s professional services, respectively.
19The existence of a prevailing hourly rate in the relevant
area that exceeds the statutory rate is not a special factor.
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571-572 (1988); Foothill Ranch
Co. Pship. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 94, 102 (1998).
20We compute Ms. Pearson’s fees as follows: 4.1 hours
multiplied by $150 hourly rate equals $615.
21We compute Ms. Merriam’s fees as follows: 6.4 hours
multiplied by $150 hourly rate equals $960.
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