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to petitioners, Jacob was the architect of the ESOP and, as such,
was precluded by Rule 24(g)(1) from representing them.
Petitioners also assert that Jacob was a potential witness who
was precluded from representing them by Rule 24(g)(3).
On the basis of the record at hand, we reject petitioners’
primary argument. Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the Court
was informed on two occasions by respondent as to an issue
involving Jacob and Rule 24(g). First, respondent informed the
Court on September 25, 2001, that there were problems under Rule
24(g) with Jacob’s representation. Second, respondent informed
the Court in his pretrial memorandum, filed October 5, 2001, that
there were potential problems under Rule 24(g)(1) and (3) with
Jacob’s representation. As petitioners correctly state, a
necessary element of fraud on the Court is the Court’s lack of
knowledge regarding a material fact so that “damage to the
judicial process is sustained.” Spence-Parker v. Md. Ins. Group,
937 F. Supp. 551, 562 (E.D. Va. 1996). In Spence-Parker, the
plaintiff sued the defendant insurance company, alleging that she
was entitled to recover under an insurance policy issued by the
defendant to a third party. In a prior action against the third
6(...continued)
disappointed party challenges a decision on the ground
that the party’s prior counsel had a conflict of
interest. Paragraph (f) is designed to insure that the
bar of this Court disclose or rectify any conflict of
interest. [93 T.C. 858.]
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