Myrtle Jean Clark - Page 9

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          of discretion for the Commissioner to deny a request for relief             
          under section 6015(f) by applying the 2-year statute of                     
          limitations,6 the Court in McGee stated:                                    
               It would be inequitable if respondent could prevent                    
               review of a request for relief under section 6015(f) by                
               failing to inform petitioner of her right to relief in                 
               defiance of a congressional mandate.  Such a result                    
               would be contrary to the very purpose of section                       
               6015(f), which is to relieve inequitable situations                    
               involving joint liabilities. * * *                                     
          McGee v. Commissioner, supra at 319; see also Nelson v.                     
          Commissioner, supra.                                                        
               Respondent contends that the date of the first collection              
          activity in each of the tax years at issue was the date                     
          collection notices were mailed to petitioner and Mr. Clark on               
          December 13, 2000.  The collection notices are not in the                   
          administrative record of the IRS and were not presented as                  
          evidence at trial.  There is no evidence that the collection                
          notices informed petitioner of her right to apply for relief                

               6In McGee, the Court decided that applying the statute of              
          limitations imposed by Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, was             
          an abuse of discretion.  McGee v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 314, 319           
          (2004).  Though the statute of limitations applied in this case             
          was imposed by sec. 1.6015-5, Income Tax Regs., and not by Rev.             
          Proc. 2000-15, supra, the interpretation remains the same.  Any             
          other interpretation would be in conflict with the public law.              
          Additionally, it should be noted that Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2            
          C.B. 296, not Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, applies to tax           
          years 1992 and 1993 in this case because Rev. Proc. 2003-61,                
          supra, supersedes Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra, for requests still             
          pending on Nov. 1, 2003, for which no preliminary determination             
          letter had been issued as of Nov. 1, 2003.  The notice of                   
          preliminary determination for 1992 and 1993 was mailed to                   
          petitioner on Jan. 29, 2004.                                                




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