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excess of the statutory limit. See sec. 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii).
Petitioner does not argue, and has otherwise failed to
demonstrate, that there was a limited availability of qualified
attorneys or of attorneys with tax expertise to represent her in
this case or that the issues presented were sufficiently
difficult to support her claim for an enhanced hourly rate. The
fact that petitioner’s attorneys billed her and the other Hoyt
investor clients for professional services at a rate lower than
the local customary rate does not establish that the fees
petitioner claims are reasonable.19 We conclude, therefore, that
petitioner may not recover attorney’s fees in excess of $150 per
hour. Id.
With respect to the attorney’s fees and costs charged to
petitioner’s individual account, we award petitioner $1,320 for
work performed by Ms. Pearson20 and $435 for work performed by Ms.
Merriam.21 Because Ms. Gellner’s hourly rate does not exceed the
statutory limit, we find that her fees are reasonable and award
petitioner $1,806 for Ms. Gellner’s professional services.
19The existence of a prevailing hourly rate in the relevant
area that exceeds the statutory rate is not a special factor.
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571-572 (1988); Foothill Ranch
Co. Pship. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 94, 102 (1998).
20We compute the award of Ms. Pearson’s fees as follows:
8.8 hours multiplied by $150 hourly rate equals $1,320.
21We compute the award of Ms. Merriam’s fees as follows:
2.9 hours multiplied by $150 hourly rate equals $435.
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