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I.112 Although the parties relied upon many of the terms and
understandings embodied in that agreement for the purchases made
after phase I, nonetheless, that contract obligated the parties
only to phase I. We believe that the legislative history sheds
light on the contractual relationship for phases II and III:
The conferees also wish to clarify that the
general binding contract rule does not apply to supply
agreements with manufacturers, where such contracts
fail to specify the amount or design specifications of
property to be purchased; such contracts are not to be
treated as binding contracts until purchase orders are
actually placed. A purchase order for a specific
number of properties, based on the pricing provisions
of the supply agreement, will be treated as a binding
contract. [Emphasis added.]
H. Conf. Rept. 99-841 (Vol. II), supra at II-55 to II-56, 1986-3
C.B. (Vol. 4) at 55-56. Petitioner has not offered any written
contract or purchase order under which property was purchased
after phase I. The record contains only the A.B. Chance contract
and FPL’s ERs and BIs for the property/equipment claimed.
Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to claim an ITC under TRA
section 203(b)(1)(A) for the LMS equipment purchases after phase
I.
112 We think that the property and equipment purchases during
phases II and III, the period before us, were more akin to a
supply or requirements contractual relationship. Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, requirements contracts are enforceable.
E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 435 (S.D.
Fla. 1975); see Fla. Stat. Ann. sec. 672.306 (West 2004).
However, we do not make a finding or conclusion that this
relationship was a supply or requirements contract.
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