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1995, we cannot conclude that petitioner was in a trade or
business in the customary use of those terms. Petitioner did not
perform services for others, he had no customers, and he was not
in the business of trading securities or gambling on a regular
and continuous basis. See id. at 33-34. Petitioner’s asserted
purpose was to secure the compensation to which he was entitled.
Although a trade or business requires continuous and regular
activity, continuity and regularity, do not, standing alone,
constitute a trade or business. Petitioner’s position ignores
the distinction between section 162 and section 212--a
distinction well-established in history.
In Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941), the
Supreme Court held that the salaries and expenses incident to
looking after a taxpayer’s own investments were not deductible
under section 23 (the predecessor of section 162(a)). In so
holding, the Supreme Court stated that "No matter how large the
estate or how continuous or extended the work required may be”,
the fact that the taxpayer kept records and collected interest
and dividends from his securities through managerial attention
for his investments was not sufficient as a matter of law to
permit deduction of the expenses in dispute. Id.
The Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, sec. 121, 56 Stat. 819,
amended the Internal Revenue Code in response to Higgins and to
give relief to “Higgins-type” taxpayers. See H. Rept. 2333, 77th
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