George G. Green - Page 30

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          Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), 1942-2 C.B. 372.  In Whipple v.                     
          Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 200 (1963), the Supreme Court                   
          explained:                                                                  
               section 23(a) [the predecessor of section 162(a)] was                  
               amended not by disturbing the Court's definition of                    
               “trade or business” but by following the pattern that                  
               had been established since 1916 of “[enlarging] the                    
               category of incomes with reference to which expenses                   
               were deductible,” to include expenses incurred in the                  
               production of income.  [Citations omitted.]                            
               The 1942 amendment divided the old section 23(a) into two              
          parts.  One, section 23(a)(1), dealt with the previously                    
          deductible “trade or business” expenses, now covered by section             
          162; the other, section 23(a)(2), dealt with a new category of              
          deductions relating to nontrade or nonbusiness expenses, now                
          covered by section 212.  The new category was intended to allow             
          deductions regarding certain income- or profit-oriented                     
          activities, notwithstanding the absence of a “trade or business”.           
          See Carbine v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 356, 360-361 (1984), affd.             
          779 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 1985).  The reasoning behind the adoption           
          of section 212 supports respondent’s contention that petitioner             
          is allowed deductions related to his income-producing activities            
          to collect his judgment against the State only to the extent                
          provided under that statute.  Petitioner’s situation is analogous           
          to that of the taxpayers in Usry v. Price, 325 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.           
          1963), and Feagans v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 208 (1954).                     







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