-48-
* * * are placed in service in any taxable year of the
partnership or S corporation”. Sec. 465(c)(2)(B)(i).
Petitioners read the quoted text, with a focus especially on
the word “any”, to mean that all of LCL’s equipment leasing
activities are viewed as a single activity, notwithstanding the
fact that all of the activities did not arise in the same taxable
year. We read that text differently. While petitioners focus
primarily on the single word “any” to support their
interpretation, the word “any” may not be construed in isolation
but must be construed in the context of the statute as a whole.
See Small v. United States, U.S. , 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005);
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994).
Statutes should be interpreted as a whole to give effect to every
clause, sentence, and word therein, see Market Co. v. Hoffman,
101 U.S. 112, 115 (1879), and the duty of a court is to render
that type of interpretation whenever possible, cf. United States
v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955); Montclair v. Ramsdell,
107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883). Such an approach is a “cardinal
principle of statutory construction”. Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000).
In accordance with that approach, we apply the plain meaning
of the words set forth in section 465(c)(2)(B), see Venture
Funding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 236, 241-242 (1998),
affd. without published opinion 198 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 1999), and
Page: Previous 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011