Estate of Edna Korby - Page 23

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          commercial and personal injury liability resulting from their               
          bridge-building business, as well as liability arising from                 
          divorce.  The estate points to provisions in the KPLP agreement             
          that prevented any partner from unilaterally forcing a                      
          distribution of partnership property and restricted transfer of             
          the limited partnership interests.  However, the estate has not             
          shown that the terms of the KPLP agreement would prevent a                  
          creditor of a partner from obtaining that partner’s KPLP interest           
          in an involuntary transfer.  The limited protection KPLP gave the           
          family and the other evidence in the record lead us to believe              
          that credit protection was not a significant reason for forming             
          KPLP; rather, Austin and Edna formed KPLP in order to make a                
          testamentary transfer of their assets to their sons at a                    
          discounted value while still having access to the income from               
          those assets for their lifetime.  Instead of retaining assets               
          sufficient to provide the income they would need as their medical           
          expenses grew, Austin and Edna used KPLP in an attempt to                   
          insulate all of their income-producing assets from the estate               
          tax.  As a result, we find that the transfer of Austin’s and                
          Edna’s assets to KPLP was not a bona fide sale for full and                 
          adequate consideration.  Therefore, section 2036(a)(1) applies to           
          the KPLP assets that were contributed by Austin and Edna.  Given            
          this conclusion, we need not address respondent’s argument for              
          inclusion under sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038.                               






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