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also conceded that the estate is entitled to the marital
deduction under section 2056 for the “property the [living] trust
owned upon Edna Korby’s death.” The living trust held the house,
the vacant lot, the checking account, the general partnership
interest in Crane Properties, and the general partnership
interest in KPLP at Edna’s death. Therefore, the marital
deduction applies with respect to this property. The unified
credit for 1998 will then be applied against the tax imposed by
section 2001 on the taxable estate.10
We note that the estate argues that respondent’s position
with respect to the marital deduction issue should be treated as
a concession of the issue of whether the transfer to KPLP
precludes the application of section 2036 to the transferred
assets. Respondent argues that his statement was not a
9(...continued)
disagree. Equitable estoppel precludes a party from denying its
own representations if they induced another to act to his
detriment. See Wilkins v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 109, 112
(2003). At a minimum, a taxpayer must rely to his detriment on
the Commissioner’s actions in order to bind the Commissioner by
equitable estoppel. See Boulez v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209, 215
(1981), affd. 810 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The estate did not
rely to its detriment on respondent’s counsel’s communication; on
the contrary, because respondent’s counsel’s statement was not
included in the stipulations of fact, the estate presented
evidence at trial and argued its position that the marital
deduction should apply to the KPLP assets.
10It is not necessary for us to address the effect of the
provision in the living trust splitting it into two new trusts at
the death of the first spouse to die because respondent conceded
that the marital deduction applies to the property held by the
living trust at Edna’s death.
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