Joan Phyllis Levy - Page 17

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          1989, affg. T.C. Memo. 1988-63.4  The standard to be applied is             
          whether a “reasonably prudent taxpayer under the circumstances of           
          the [requesting] spouse at the time of signing the return could             
          be expected to know that the tax liability stated was erroneous             
          or that further investigation was warranted.”  Stevens v.                   
          Commissioner, supra at 1505; Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126,            
          148 (1990), affd. on other issues 992 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1993).           
          This standard applies to deductions as well as income matters.              
          Stevens v. Commissioner, supra at 1505 n.8; Bokum v.                        
          Commissioner, supra at 148.5                                                


               4 Kistner v. Commissioner, 18 F.3d 1521, 1525-1527 (11th               
          Cir. 1994), revg. and remanding T.C. Memo. 1991-463, and Stevens            
          v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C.           
          Memo. 1988-63, involved former sec. 6013(e)(1)(C) rather than               
          current sec. 6015(b)(1)(C).  The language of both provisions,               
          however, is roughly the same.  See Mora v. Commissioner, 117 T.C.           
          279, 286 n.7 (2001).                                                        
               5 Some of the Courts of Appeals have adopted a more lenient            
          approach than the Tax Court in deduction cases where a requesting           
          spouse knows of the transaction that gave rise to the                       
          understatement.  See Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 115-             
          116 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003).  The Court of             
          Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit appears not to have squarely               
          decided this issue of which approach it will adopt for deduction            
          cases.  See Kistner v. Commissioner, supra at 1527 (noting                  
          favorably cases from other circuits adopting this more lenient              
          approach); Ferrarese v. Commissioner, 75 AFTR2d 95-524, 95-525,             
          95-1 USTC par. 50,038, at 87,139 (11th Cir. 1994), affg. per                
          curiam T.C. Memo. 1993-404.  Because we believe that petitioner             
          has failed to meet her burden of showing she had no reason to               
          know of the 1979 deficiency under the more lenient approach, any            
          disparity between that more lenient approach and the Tax Court’s            
          approach is immaterial to our disposition of this case.  See                
          Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 116.                                       






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