- 21 -
knowledge” exception to relief in section 6015(c)(3)(C) (citing
Culver v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 189, 194-196 (2001))).9
In opposing petitioner’s claim for separate liability
election relief under section 6015(c), respondent essentially
argues only that there is insufficient evidence in the record
upon which to allocate or attribute the items giving rise to the
1979 deficiency to Levy.10 We disagree.
As previously discussed, Levy testified that the 1979
deficiency arose from a tax shelter in which he invested. Levy
confirmed that petitioner did not participate and had no
involvement in the tax shelter investment. We found his
testimony to be credible. The record reflects that petitioner
played no role whatsoever in and had little knowledge of Levy’s
medical business or his other financial dealings. Petitioner was
a full-time homemaker and did not have her own source of income
until 1999. Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the
evidence that the 1979 deficiency is entirely allocable to Levy.
See, e.g., Mora v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. at 290-291; cf. Feldman
9 Unlike sec. 6015(b), a mere “reason to know” is
insufficient to preclude relief under sec. 6015(c). See Cheshire
v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 326, 337 n.26 (5th Cir. 2002), affg.
115 T.C. 183 (2000); Charlton v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 333, 341-
342 (2000).
10 Respondent has not argued that either the tax benefit
exception of sec. 6015(d)(3)(B) or the fraud exception of sec.
6015(d)(3)(C) is applicable. See Mora v. Commissioner, 117 T.C.
at 293-294. There are no facts to suggest that either exception
applies here.
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