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respondent asserts: (1) Petitioner directly and significantly
benefited from Levy’s payment of all the expenses of maintaining
petitioner’s separate household (including the mortgage, condo
fees, utilities and other expenses) following their separation in
1994; (2) petitioner directly benefited through receiving the Key
Biscayne condominium under her and Levy’s marital settlement
agreement; and (3) she indirectly benefited through Levy’s
payment of their three children’s college tuitions.
Although Levy paid the living expenses relating to
petitioner’s separate household and the mortgage on the Key
Biscayne condominium, such payments were not lavish expenditures
beyond what is required for petitioner’s normal support.
Petitioner thus did not significantly benefit from the unpaid
1991 through 1999 tax liabilities by Levy’s payment of her
separate household expenses. See Estate of Krock v.
Commissioner, 93 T.C. 672, 678-679 (1989) (normal support is
determined by the circumstances of the parties); Ogonoski v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-52; Foley v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1995-16.
Similarly, the transfer to petitioner of the Key Biscayne
condominium did not result in petitioner’s receiving more than
she otherwise would have as part of a divorce settlement. Under
the marital settlement agreement, petitioner received the
condominium and Levy’s promise to pay her $4,400 per month in
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