Dennis E. and Paula W. Lofstrom - Page 9

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          Dorothy in part satisfaction of Mr. Lofstrom’s accrued and future           
          alimony obligations to Dorothy qualifies as alimony.7                       
               A contract for deed is a financing arrangement that allows a           
          buyer (or vendee) to purchase property by borrowing the money for           
          the purchase from the seller (or vendor).  In re Butler, 552                
          N.W.2d 226, 229-230 (Minn. 1996).  Here, Mr. Lofstrom had                   
          transferred property to Mark Lofstrom in return for periodic                
          payments from Mark Lofstrom until the full principal amount, with           
          interest, was paid.  The contract for deed represented,                     
          therefore, a debt obligation of Mark Lofstrom to Mr. Lofstrom.              
          Because the contract for deed transferred to Dorothy is a debt              
          instrument of a third party, it does not qualify as a cash                  
          payment and is not deductible as alimony.8  See secs. 71(b)(1),             
          215(a); sec. 1.71-1T(b), Q&A-5, Temporary Income Tax Regs.,                 



               7The Minnesota legislature has sanctioned contracts for deed           
          because they provide a useful alternative financing mechanism,              
          which promotes the availability of credit and the transferability           
          of property.  In re Butler, 552 N.W.2d 226, 229-230 (Minn. 1996)            
          (citing Minn. Stat. sec. 559.205-.216 (1994)).                              
               8Further, once Mr. Lofstrom transferred the contract for               
          deed to Dorothy, Mark Lofstrom’s liability to make payments under           
          the contract would not end at Dorothy’s death.  We note that                
          alimony does not include a liability to make payments after the             
          payee’s death.  Sec. 71(b)(1)(D); see also Sugarman v.                      
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-410 (payments found in the nature             
          of a property settlement rather than alimony where payments would           
          not necessarily have terminated if the taxpayer died before the             
          end of the payment stream because the taxpayer’s estate would               
          have had a valid claim for the remainder of the payments).                  






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