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courts explicitly rejected the taxpayers’ arguments premised on
fiduciary duties as running afoul of this principle of
construction. Scott v. United States, supra at 140; Mellon Bank,
N.A. v. United States, supra at 1280-1281. In the words of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:
we would, by holding that a trust’s investment-advice
fees were fully deductible, render meaningless the
second requirement of � 67(e)(1). All trust-related
administrative expenses could be attributed to a
trustee’s fiduciary duties, and the broad reading of
� 67(e)(1) urged by the taxpayers would treat as fully
deductible any costs associated with a trust. But the
second clause of � 67(e)(1) specifically limits the
applicability of � 67(e) to certain types of trust-
related administrative expenses. To give effect to
this limitation, we must hold that the investment-
advice fees incurred by the Trust do not qualify for
the exception created by � 67(e). Rather, they are
subject to the 2% floor established by � 67(a). [Scott
v. United States, supra at 140.]
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit characterized
the contrary analysis in this regard of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in O’Neill v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d at 304, as
containing “a fatal flaw”. Scott v. United States, supra at 140.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit similarly branded
the taxpayer’s attempts to bolster its interpretation through
legislative history as “unpersuasive.” Mellon Bank, N.A. v.
United States, supra at 1281. To wit, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, tracing the genesis of section 67(e), noted
that to premise full deduction of all trust expenses on fiduciary
duties would run counter to
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