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2. Section 6330(d)(1) Does Not Expand the Tax Court’s
Jurisdiction
Petitioners assert that section 6330(d)(1) is a new and
independent grant of jurisdiction, that Congress intended this
Court to have primary jurisdiction over section 6330 hearings,
and “If the limiting language of IRC �6330(d)(1)(B) is examined
with an [sic] view to the purpose of the language, it is obvious
[section 6652(c)(1)] is a matter over which the Tax Court should
insist it has jurisdiction.” Petitioners further argue:
“If Congress intended to narrowly conscribe the Tax Court’s
jurisdiction under IRC �6330(d)(1), it could easily have done so.
Instead, Congress used the broadest possible language to describe
the jurisdiction of the Tax Court under �6330(d)(1).” We
disagree.
In Moore v. Commissioner, supra at 175, this Court stated:
While Congress clearly intended for section 6330 to
provide an opportunity for judicial review of
collection matters, we interpret section 6330(d)(1)(A)
and (B) together to mean that Congress did not intend
to expand the Court’s jurisdiction beyond the types of
taxes that the Court may normally consider. Thus,
section 6330(d)(1)(A) and (B) provides for Tax Court
jurisdiction except where the Court does not normally
have jurisdiction over the underlying liability.
See also Van Es v. Commissioner, supra at 328 (holding that
section 6330(d)(1) does not expand the Court’s jurisdiction to
cover section 6702 frivolous return penalties). Petitioners
assert that Congress did not intend such a narrow reading but
cite no authority.
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Last modified: May 25, 2011