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danger of self-incrimination.” (internal quotations omitted)),
affg. 76 T.C. 1027 (1981).
Having reviewed relevant caselaw on the matter, the Court is
satisfied that this litigation is not materially distinguishable
from cases such as Wheelis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-102,
affd. 63 Fed. Appx. 375 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2002-95, affd. 61 Fed. Appx. 471 (9th Cir. 2003); and
Ruocco v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-91, affd. 346 F.3d 223
(1st Cir. 2003). In the foregoing cases, all involving
contentions nearly identical to those raised here, the Court
rejected the taxpayers’ Fifth Amendment arguments as follows:
The phrase that comes readily to mind was first used by
the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Sullivan,
274 U.S. 259, 264 (1927), to wit, a taxpayer may not
“draw a conjurer’s circle around the whole matter” of
his or her tax liability. * * * In a civil tax case,
the taxpayer must accept the consequences of asserting
the Fifth Amendment and cannot avoid the burden of
proof by claiming the privilege and attempting to
convert “the shield * * * which it was intended to be
into a sword”. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S.
752, 758 (1983) * * * [Wheelis v. Commissioner, supra.]
See also Lee v. Commissioner, supra; Ruocco v. Commissioner,
supra.
In contrast, cases relied upon by petitioner, in particular
United States v. Nipper, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (N.D. Okla. 2002),
are distinguishable. The court in that case reiterated that the
constitutional standard required a “substantial and real” risk of
incrimination. Id. at 1260. The court, noting that the
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