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Commissioner, 37 F.3d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 1994), affg. 102 T.C.
558 (1994) and T.C. Memo. 1992-698. The legislative history of
section 7476 makes clear that Congress did not expect the Court
to conduct a trial de novo in declaratory judgment actions
arising under that section, no matter whether that action arose
with respect to the initial qualification or the continuing
qualification of a retirement plan. See Tamko Asphalt Prods.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 658 F.2d 735, 738-739 (10th Cir. 1981),
affg. 71 T.C. 824 (1979); H. Rept. 93-807, at 108 (1974), 1974-3
C.B. (Supp.) 236, 343; S. Rept. 93-383, at 114 (1973), 1974-3
C.B. (Supp.) 80, 193; see also Wenzel v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d
at 696. Therefore, discovery or introduction of extrinsic
evidence in such cases is inconsistent with the legislative
intent that such cases be resolved without a trial based solely
on the materials contained in the administrative record. See
Dr. Erol Bastug, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-262 (“The
rule of law cited in Houston Lawyer Referral and Tamko Asphalt is
predicated upon the legislative concern that the Court not bypass
the administrative determination procedure without good cause.”);
see also Note to Rule 217(a), 68 T.C. 1048 (1977); Prefatory Note
to amendments to this Court’s Rules in respect of declaratory
judgments under section 7476, 64 T.C. 1177-1179 (1975).
Consistent with this legislative intent, the Court has previously
held that it will not permit the administrative record to be
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