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no reason to disagree with the essence of Cochran’s determination
that petitioners’ health does not render them “incapable of
earning a living”, nor have we reason to conclude that
petitioners’ “financial resources will be exhausted providing for
care and support during the course of the condition”.12 Id.
We also are mindful that any decision by Cochran to accept
petitioners’ offer-in-compromise due to doubt of collectibility
with special circumstances must be viewed against the backdrop of
section 301.7122-1(b)(3)(iii), Proced. & Admin. Regs. That
section requires that Cochran deny petitioners’ offer if her
acceptance of it would undermine voluntary compliance with tax
laws by taxpayers in general. Thus, even if we were to assume
arguendo that petitioners would suffer economic hardship, a
finding that we emphasize we decline to make, we would not find
that Cochran’s rejection of petitioners’ offer was an abuse of
discretion because we conclude below (in our discussion of
petitioners’ fifth argument) that her acceptance of that offer
would have undermined voluntary compliance with tax laws by
12 We also note that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 710 (9th Cir.
2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-13, dismissed a similar claim of
economic hardship advanced by the taxpayers there. Although
those taxpayers had more assets than petitioners, the court
emphasized that a finding of economic hardship is within the
discretion of Appeals. Under the facts at hand, we find no abuse
of discretion in Cochran’s determination that petitioners would
suffer no economic hardship were they required to pay more than
their $32,000 offer.
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