Jerry and Patricia A. Dixon, et al. - Page 70

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          expenses in the amount of $248,049.27 in respect of the PH                  
          petitioners’ appellate fee request.54                                       
          IV.  Interest                                                               
               The PH petitioners seek interest on their fee award from               
          January 17, 2003 (the date of the Court of Appeals’ Dixon V                 
          opinion).  As discussed in Part III.B.4.c., supra, the “no-                 
          interest” rule prohibits the recovery of interest in a suit                 
          against the Government absent an express waiver of sovereign                
          immunity from an award of interest.  Library of Congress v. Shaw,           
          478 U.S. at 311.  Section 7430 contains no such express waiver,             
          see Wilkerson v. United States, 67 F.3d at 120 n.15; Miller v.              
          Alamo, 992 F.2d at 767; Austin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-            
          157, and petitioners do not point to any other provision that               
          might fit the bill.  Cf. Miller v. Alamo, supra at 767 (rejecting           
          the argument that 28 U.S.C. sec. 1961(c)(1) operates as an                  
          express waiver of sovereign immunity from interest on a section             
          7430 fee award).  Accordingly, we deny the PH petitioners’                  
          request for interest on their fee award.55                                  


          54 We shall address the manner in which the awards are to be                
          administered in a separate order or orders implementing this                
          opinion.  In that regard, we note that some nontest case                    
          petitioners who contributed to the Defense Fund during the                  
          relevant period have not been asked to submit net worth                     
          affidavits and therefore have not had the opportunity to                    
          establish their right to share in the awards.                               
          55 We recognize that in Dixon IV we granted postjudgment                    
          interest on petitioners’ sec. 6673(a)(2) fee award.  We did so              
          sua sponte on the basis of “this Court’s inherent power to                  
          protect its own proceedings from abuse, oppression, and                     
                                                              (continued...)          



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