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It would appear that, in issuing its opinion and mandates in
Dixon V, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, consistent
with its opinion in Commissioner v. Branson, supra, adopted the
view that the Tax Court had and has equitable power to resolve
the situation then before it, and now before us.
More to the point, we regard respondent’s concession not to
collect interest on deficiencies that would otherwise accrue
beyond June 1992 as an appropriately targeted response to the
consequences of his former attorneys’ fraud on the court, which
caused substantial delay in the resolution of the Kersting
project cases.68 We have respondent’s assurance that he will
give effect to the concession; we are satisfied he will do so.
Moreover, in accepting and endorsing respondent’s concession, we
need not and do not reach petitioners’ argument that the Tax
Court has the power and obligation to abate or cancel interest on
deficiencies as of an earlier date.69
68On May 14, 1992, test case petitioners Dixon, DuFresne,
Young, and Hongsermeier had already appealed their test cases,
before the misconduct of respondent’s attorneys was discovered
and disclosed. It is reasonable to assume that the conduct of
their appeals would have caused a delay of at least 1 or 2 years
before the Kersting project test cases would have been finally
decided, even if there had been no such misconduct. In these
circumstances, we would not be inclined, even if our power to do
so were clear, to cancel or abate interest as of an earlier date
than respondent has conceded.
69In any event, we reject petitioners’ citation and
discussion of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214,
1231 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), revd. 494 U.S.
(continued...)
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