- 8 - Regs., supra. Petitioner contends that it did not satisfy the ownership test because all of its stock was held by a nonemployee, Ms. Felton. That said, petitioner has done nothing to convince us that Ms. Felton is anything other than an employee. Section 448(d)(2) does not adequately define the term “employee”,7 but as a general rule, when Congress has used the term without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional relationship as understood by common law. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992). Likewise, both the Court and the Commissioner have adopted common-law rules to distinguish employees from independent contractors. See Weber v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 378, 387 (1994), affd. 60 F.3d 1104 (4th Cir. 1995); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, supra at 324. The primary feature in this analysis is control over the manner and means by which an employee performs his or her services. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, supra; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003) (describing the element of control as the “principal guidepost”); Ron Lykins, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-35. 7 Sec. 1.448-1T(e)(5)(ii), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra, does contain a definition of employee, but it does not appear to be helpful in these circumstances.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Next
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