Searcy M. Ferguson, Jr., and Elizabeth L. Ferguson - Page 5

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          claim.2  The court noted that petitioner had agreed pursuant to             
          the 1989 settlement agreement not to reopen the divorce case or             
          the divorce agreement.  Consequently, the court held petitioner             
          and the corporation to be barred by judgment and estopped by                
          agreement from asserting the conversion claim against Ms. Smith.3           
          The Southampton Property                                                    
               During their marriage, Ms. Smith and petitioner owned real             
          property located in Southampton, New York (the Southampton                  
          property).  The divorce agreement designated the Southampton                
          property as the separate property of Ms. Smith.  With respect to            
          encumbrances on real property subject to the divorce agreement,             
          the divorce agreement contained the following indemnity provision           
          (the indemnity provision):                                                  
                    Assumption of Encumbrances.  Each party hereby                    
               assumes the encumbrances, ad valorem taxes and liens on                
               all the property each will hold subsequent to the date                 
               of this Agreement, unless express provision is made                    
               herein to the contrary; and each party agrees to                       
               indemnify and hold harmless the other party and his or                 
               her property from any claim or liability that the other                
               party will suffer or may be required to pay because of                 
               such encumbrances or liens.                                            


               2As discussed below, the trial court also granted summary              
          judgment with respect to petitioner’s claims that Ms. Smith                 
          breached the divorce agreement by failing to assume the liability           
          for liens on certain real property and for failing to file a                
          proper 1986 Federal income tax return.                                      
               3Although petitioner and the corporation appealed the                  
          judgment of the trial court, they did not claim on appeal that              
          the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with respect             
          to the conversion claim.                                                    





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