Jerre Marvine Wood - Page 4

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          conducted petitioner’s section 6330 hearing based on the                    
          correspondence received from petitioner.  Respondent’s Appeals              
          officer determined that the proposed levy was appropriate and, on           
          August 17, 2005, sent petitioner a notice of determination.                 
          Petitioner timely petitioned this Court pursuant to section 6330.           
          Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment and to impose a              
          penalty pursuant to section 6673 on August 21, 2006, and                    
          petitioner filed a response and a supplemental response on                  
          August 29, and September 13, 2006, respectively.                            
               Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and                
          avoid unnecessary and expensive trials and may be granted where             
          there is no genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be            
          rendered as a matter of law.  Rule 121(a) and (b); Fla. Peach               
          Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988).  The moving party           
          bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of               
          material fact, and factual inferences are viewed in a light most            
          favorable to the nonmoving party.  Craig v. Commissioner, 119               
          T.C. 252, 260 (2002); Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821           
          (1985); Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982).  The              
          party opposing summary judgment must set forth specific facts               
          that show a genuine question of material fact exists and may not            

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