- 30 -
439 F.3d at 1254-1256; Sanders v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-
163. Petitioner’s reliance on Bales was unreasonable.
On the basis of the above, we conclude that petitioner did
not have reasonable cause for his underpayments of tax.
2. Judicial Estoppel
In general terms, petitioner asks the Court to “apply the
doctrine of judicial estoppel to facts Respondent has asserted in
previous litigation.” Petitioner does not elaborate.
Presumably, petitioner is arguing that because the U.S.
Government successfully prosecuted Hoyt for fraud, respondent is
somehow judicially estopped from asserting an accuracy-related
penalty against petitioner.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from
asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with
a position successfully taken by that party in a previous
proceeding. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001).
Among the requirements for judicial estoppel to be invoked, a
party’s current litigating position must be “clearly
inconsistent” with a prior litigating position. Id. at 750-751.
Respondent’s position in asserting an accuracy-related
penalty against petitioner is in no manner inconsistent with the
position taken by the United States in the criminal conviction of
Hoyt. See, e.g., Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d at 408
(taxpayer-appellants’ argument that an investment partnership
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