- 4 - Hoyt’s enrolled agent status was revoked. In 2001, Hoyt was convicted of criminal charges relating to the promotion of these partnerships.3 Petitioner reported partnership losses from TBS and TBS 1989-1 on his Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 1989 of $3,560 and $27,509, respectively, and for 1991 of $33,782 and $59,179, respectively. Petitioner’s claim to the losses resulted in the underreporting of his 1989 and 1991 taxable income. On May 13, 2002, additional income taxes and interest 3 Petitioner asks the Court to take judicial notice of certain “facts” in other Hoyt-related cases and apply judicial estoppel to “facts respondent has asserted in previous [Hoyt- related] litigation”. The Court will do neither. A judicially noticeable fact is one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Petitioner is not asking the Court to take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute. Instead, petitioner is asking the Court to take judicial notice of the truth of assertions made by taxpayers and the Commissioner in other Hoyt-related cases. Such assertions are not the proper subject of judicial notice. The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a position successfully taken by that party in a previous proceeding. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001). Among the requirements for judicial estoppel to be invoked, a party’s current litigating position must be “clearly inconsistent” with a prior litigating position. Id. at 750-751. Petitioner has failed to identify any clear inconsistencies between respondent’s current position and his position in any previous litigation.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011