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the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.’” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)
(quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). Further,
petitioners’ contention that the word “automobile bus” is
insignificant also renders the 1978 amendment substituting
automobile bus for vehicle superfluous. One of the stated
purposes of the 1978 amendment was to “encourage greater use of
bus transportation.” S. Rept. 95-529, supra at 54, 1978-3 C.B.
(Vol. 2) at 246. We cannot ignore the overwhelming evidence of
deliberate intent to include the word “bus” in the statute.
Therefore, we reject petitioners’ argument. After arguing that
the term “automobile bus” has no significance in the statute,
petitioners argue in the alternative that we should accept their
proffered plain meaning of “automobile bus”. Petitioners surmise
that Congress meant to use the word “automobile” in its noun form
to describe the traits that the word “bus” is supposed to have.
The noun form of “automobile” is commonly defined as a “four-
wheeled automotive vehicle”. Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary (1993). Together with the word “bus”, petitioners
conclude that Congress meant to include all four-wheeled vehicles
which travel on regular routes in defining what vehicles qualify
for the exemption. Respondent argues that Congress meant the
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