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We conclude that petitioner is collaterally estopped from
denying that he used mail and electronic means to obtain loans
from financial institutions by fraud and misrepresentation, and
that he was convicted of 1 count of conspiracy to defraud a
financial institution, 12 counts of bank fraud, 9 counts of mail
fraud, 10 counts of wire fraud, 37 counts of making false
statements to financial institutions, and 2 counts of
racketeering under 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c) and (d) (2000).
Petitioner is also estopped from denying that he was
convicted of violating section 7206(1) for 1985 and 1986, and
more specifically, that (1) he signed a tax return under the
penalties of perjury; (2) he did not believe the return to be
correct as to every material matter; and (3) he acted willfully.
See United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 644, 651 (11th Cir. 1985).
4. Whether Petitioner Is Collaterally Estopped From
Disputing That He Had Income in 1985 Equal to the
Portion of the Loans He Put in His Accounts
Respondent contends that, as a result of his conviction
under section 7206(1), petitioner is collaterally estopped from
denying that he received and knowingly failed to report
$1,372,3603 of income in 1985. We disagree.
The trial judge in petitioner’s criminal case made clear
that the jury was not asked to decide the amount of petitioner’s
3 The amount of unreported income alleged in the indictment
was $1,361,361.79.
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