- 14 -
Respondent argues that doubt as to future compliance is a
sufficient reason to reject an offer-in-compromise. Respondent
contends that although the default provision of an offer-in-
compromise affords respondent some protection, it is not enough.
Respondent notes, citing Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85
(2004), revd. 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006), that where taxpayers
violate the future compliance condition, courts have not always
found violations to be material and do not always allow
respondent to terminate an offer. The Court is not convinced by
respondent’s speculative argument. Courts have found offers-in-
compromise materially breached and have allowed termination of
the offer in appropriate cases where taxpayers fail to make
payments agreed to in the offer-in-compromise, fail to pay off
the amount compromised, or fail to pay taxes owed during the 5-
year period after the offer has been accepted. E.g., United
States v. Feinberg, 372 F.2d 352, 357-358 (3d Cir. 1965); United
States v. Lane, 303 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1962); Roberts v. United
States, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1148 (E.D. Mo. 2001); United States
v. Wilson, 182 F. Supp. 567, 571 (D.N.J. 1960).
II. Conclusion
Taking into account the inconsistency of IRM sec. 5.8.7.6(5)
and policy statement P-5-100, the “best interest of the
government” reasoning behind respondent’s rejection of
petitioner’s offer is unclear. Absent clarification, the Court
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011