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VASQUEZ, J., dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the
majority opinion’s holdings primarily because I believe they are
contrary to the controlling statute and legislative intent.
I. Whether Petitioner Entitled to a Refund
A. Statutory Interpretation and Construction
In interpreting section 6015, the Court should give effect
to congressional intent. Ewing v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 494,
503 (2002); Fernandez v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 324, 329 (2000).
Congress enacted section 6015 in the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206,
sec. 3201, 112 Stat. 734, as a means of expanding relief to
innocent spouses. See Hopkins v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 451,
458-459 (2003) (“section 6015 was enacted to provide spouses with
broader access to relief from joint and several tax
liabilities”); Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 159-160
(2003) (“We believe that Congress wanted to grant the broadest
relief, while providing certainty in the settlement of tax refund
claims”); H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 249-255 (1998), 1998-3 C.B.
747, 1003-1009; S. Rept. 105-174, at 65, 68 (1998), 1998-3 C.B.
537, 601, 604; H. Rept. 105-364 (Part 1), at 60-62 (1998), 1998-3
C.B. 373, 432-434. “Moreover, we are mindful that section 6015
was designed ‘to correct perceived deficiencies and inequities’,
and it is well settled law that ‘curative legislation should be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose.’”
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