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(3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser’s
judgment.” Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115
T.C. 43, 99 (2000), affd. 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002); see also,
e.g., Charlotte’s Office Boutique, Inc. v. Commissioner, 425
F.3d 1203, 1212 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting verbatim and with
approval the above three-prong test), affg. 121 T.C. 89 (2003);
Westbrook v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 868, 881 (5th Cir. 1995),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-634; Cramer v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 225,
251 (1993), affd. 64 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1995); Ma-Tran Corp. v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 158, 173 (1978); Pessin v. Commissioner, 59
T.C. 473, 489 (1972); Ellwest Stereo Theatres v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1995-610.
As regards burden of proof, section 7491(c) provides that
“the Secretary shall have the burden of production in any court
proceeding with respect to the liability of any individual for
any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount imposed by
this title.” The Commissioner satisfies this burden of
production by “[coming] forward with sufficient evidence
indicating that it is appropriate to impose the relevant penalty”
but “need not introduce evidence regarding reasonable cause,
substantial authority, or similar provisions.” Higbee v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). Rather, “it is the
taxpayer’s responsibility to raise those issues.” Id.
The notice of deficiency issued to Mr. Richardson asserted
applicability of the section 6662(a) penalty on account of
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