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decedent had the potential to commit a tort, we do not find that
she had this concern when the LRFLP was formed. Nor do we find
that tort liability was a motivation for forming the LRFLP or
that decedent’s daughter had discussed this issue with her
husband or her brother.
We also disagree with petitioners’ reasoning from a legal
point of view. Petitioners assert that decedent’s creditors
could not satisfy judgments against her by foreclosing on her
interest in the LRFLP but could only attach distributions that
the LRFLP actually made to her. By contrast, petitioners assert,
decedent’s creditors could satisfy judgments against her by
foreclosing on the assets of the Lillie Investment Trust.
Petitioners conclude from these assertions that the LRFLP offered
more creditor protection than offered by the Lillie Investment
Trust. We are unpersuaded. Whereas creditors can set aside
fraudulent transfers in both Florida and Illinois, see Fla. Stat.
Ann. sec. 726.108 (West 2000); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
160/5(a)(1) (West 2002), we are unpersuaded on the facts at hand
that decedent’s creditors would not have been able to foreclose
on substantially all of decedent’s assets transferred to the
LRFLP. See United States v. Engh, 330 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2003);
Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So. 2d 189
(Fla. 2003). Nor are we persuaded that the transfer would
withstand scrutiny in a bankruptcy court. See, e.g., Movitz v.
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