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conveys all or nearly all of his or her assets to a trust or
partnership, the likelihood of an implied agreement allowing the
individual to keep using the assets is the greatest. See Estate
of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 153; Estate of Hillgren v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-46; cf. Estate of Strangi v.
Commissioner, 417 F.3d at 477-478. The presence of an implied
agreement in such a situation is further revealed where, as here,
funds of the LRFLP were used to pay decedent’s living expenses,
to make gifts to her descendants, and, after her death, to pay
the bequests under the Lillie Investment Trust and the expenses
of her estate, including, 5 years after her death, her estate
taxes. Cf. Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 417 F.3d at 477.
No funds of the LRFLP were ever distributed to any of the other
partners of the LRFLP.
Third, decedent’s assets were transferred to the LRFLP on
the advice of counsel in order to minimize the tax on the passage
of her estate to her descendants. Petitioners assert that the
LRFLP was an entity separate from decedent. As stated above,
however, the lifetime enjoyment and possession of transferred
property may be retained by implied agreement. Decedent
transferred her assets to the LRFLP when she was 88 years old and
in poor health, and the only other partners of the LRFLP were
decedent’s children. Decedent’s children did not prevent
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