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control” the activities of the individual whose status is in
issue. See Profl. & Executive Leasing, Inc. v. Commissioner,
supra; McGuire v. United States, 349 F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir.
1965); Packard v. Commissioner, supra at 629; Weber v.
Commissioner, 103 T.C. 378, 387 (1994), affd. 60 F.3d 1104 (4th
Cir. 1995); see also Alsco Storm Windows, Inc. v. United States,
311 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1962); secs. 31.3401(c)-1(b),
31.3121(d)-1(c)(2), Employment Tax Regs. We consider this factor
first.
Mr. Speltz was contractually obligated to work for the
daycare, and he credibly testified that he understood Mrs. Speltz
had the right to control his activities. See Charles Schneider &
Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d at 155. When Mr. Speltz arrived
home, Mrs. Speltz generally split the children into two groups,
directing which children Mr. Speltz cared for and where he cared
for them. Mrs. Speltz also controlled the amount of compensation
Mr. Speltz received, and she had the contractual right to
discharge Mr. Speltz.
Further, Mr. Speltz did not require repetitious instruction.
His tasks were limited and consistent. See Ewens & Miller v.
Commissioner, 117 T.C. 263, 270 (2001) (the employer need not
supervise every detail of the work environment or set the
employee’s hours to control the employee) (citing Gen. Inv. Corp.
v. United States, 823 F.2d 337, 342 (9th Cir. 1987)); Weber v.
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