Peter F. & Maureen L. Speltz - Page 25

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          circumstances of each case.  See Estate of Wallace v.                       
          Commissioner, 95 T.C. 525, 553 (1990), affd. 965 F.2d 1038 (11th            
          Cir. 1992).  Further, there are no fixed rules or exact standards           
          for determining what constitutes reasonable compensation.  See              
          Golden Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d 637, 638 (10th Cir.            
          1955), affg. T.C. Memo. 1954-221.  With these rules in mind, we             
          determine whether the compensation Mr. Speltz received for                  
          business-related services was reasonable in amount.                         
               Mrs. Speltz recorded that Mr. Speltz worked 517.25 hours in            
          2000 and 655 hours in 2001.  During those years, Mr. Speltz                 
          received medical benefits of $3,279 and $4,255.58, respectively.            
          Mr. Speltz therefore received approximately $6.34 an hour in 2000           
          ($3,279/517.25) and $6.50 an hour in 2001 ($4,255.58/655).  Mr.             
          Speltz’s hourly rate is comparatively low considering the $13 an            
          hour that Mrs. Speltz testified she would have had to pay a                 
          daycare substitute.  Eliminating even half of Mr. Speltz’s hours            
          would produce a not unreasonable amount of compensation at $12.69           
          an hour in 2000 ($3,279/258.5) and $13.06 an hour in 2001                   
          ($4,255.58/325.75).  Even assuming arguendo, therefore, that half           
          the hours Mrs. Speltz logged for Mr. Speltz were personal and               
          disallowable, we would nonetheless still find the compensation              
          provided Mr. Speltz in the years at issue reasonable in amount.             
          IV. Whether Petitioners May Deduct Insurance Premiums                       
               In the alternative, respondent argues that the “insurance              
          premium” component of Mr. Speltz’s reimbursements is not                    




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