- 17 - IRS improperly credited the payments from Commonwealth, and that, even if respondent did not receive the funds from Commonwealth, the 1989 tax liability has been “constructively paid.” Mr. Summers further stated that he would not provide Form 433-A and petitioners’ 2003 and 2004 tax returns until respondent’s Appeals officer dealt with the above issues. Petitioners’ first contention is frivolous. Ms. Dermody was an impartial employee of respondent’s Appeals Office and had no prior involvment with petitioners. Petitioners’ second contention is equally without merit. Section 6330 does not prescribe a time for scheduling a hearing. Once respondent has referred a case to the Department of Justice for defense or prosecution, only the Attorney General or his delegate has the authority to compromise the case. See sec. 7122(a); United States v. LaSalle Natl. Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 312 (1978). Moreover, Mr. Summers advised respondent that he wished to defer the section 6330 hearing until the judgment of the District Court became final. Accordingly, respondent acted within his discretion by waiting to schedule a section 6330 hearing until after petitioners’ appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was resolved. We have already discussed petitioners’ third contention; they are precluded from challenging the issue of the proper crediting of the Commonwealth payments. Finally,Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011