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IRS improperly credited the payments from Commonwealth, and that,
even if respondent did not receive the funds from Commonwealth,
the 1989 tax liability has been “constructively paid.” Mr.
Summers further stated that he would not provide Form 433-A and
petitioners’ 2003 and 2004 tax returns until respondent’s Appeals
officer dealt with the above issues.
Petitioners’ first contention is frivolous. Ms. Dermody was
an impartial employee of respondent’s Appeals Office and had no
prior involvment with petitioners. Petitioners’ second
contention is equally without merit. Section 6330 does not
prescribe a time for scheduling a hearing. Once respondent has
referred a case to the Department of Justice for defense or
prosecution, only the Attorney General or his delegate has the
authority to compromise the case. See sec. 7122(a); United
States v. LaSalle Natl. Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 312 (1978).
Moreover, Mr. Summers advised respondent that he wished to defer
the section 6330 hearing until the judgment of the District Court
became final. Accordingly, respondent acted within his
discretion by waiting to schedule a section 6330 hearing until
after petitioners’ appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
was resolved. We have already discussed petitioners’ third
contention; they are precluded from challenging the issue of the
proper crediting of the Commonwealth payments. Finally,
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